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Does Racial and Ethnic Discrimination Vary Across 
Minority Groups? Evidence from a Field Experiment
* 
 
We conduct a large-scale audit discrimination study to measure labor market discrimination 
across different minority groups in Australia – a country where one quarter of the population 
was born overseas. To denote ethnicity, we use distinctively Anglo-Saxon, Indigenous, 
Italian, Chinese, and Middle Eastern names, and our goal is a comparison across multiple 
ethnic groups rather than focusing on a single minority as in most other studies. In all cases, 
we applied for entry-level jobs and submitted a CV showing that the candidate had attended 
high school in Australia. We find economically and statistically significant differences in 
callback rates, suggesting that ethnic minority candidates would need to apply for more jobs 
in order to receive the same number of interviews. These differences vary systematically 
across groups, with Italians (a more established migrant group) suffering less discrimination 
than Chinese and Middle Easterners (who have typically arrived more recently). We also 
explore various explanations for our empirical findings. 
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“After completing TAFE in 2005 I applied for many junior positions where no 
experience in sales was needed – even though I had worked for two years as a junior 
sales clerk. I didn’t receive any calls so I decided to legally change my name to 
Gabriella Hannah. I applied for the same jobs and got a call 30 minutes later." 
~ Gabriella Hannah, formerly Ragda Ali, Sydney 
 
I. Introduction 
How should we measure racism and discrimination? Among economists, the most common 
approach has been to compare labor market outcomes across racial or ethnic groups. But this 
method may not provide an accurate answer. If an individual’s race is correlated with some 
unobserved productive trait, then differences in economic outcomes will reflect more than just 
discrimination. Similarly, social researchers have often used surveys to measure the degree of 
racism in a society. But if respondents know the socially correct response, then this approach 
will also provide a biased estimate of true attitudes towards racial groups. When studying labor 
market outcomes, the problem arises from unobservable characteristics of racial minorities. 
When analyzing social attitudes, the problem stems from unobservable biases in the reporting 
of racial attitudes. 
In both cases, field experiments can help solve the unobservables problem by creating a 
context in which all other factors except race are held constant. In a context where the subject 
is unaware that he or she is participating in an experiment – or in which it is difficult for the 
subject to provide a socially acceptable response – it is more likely that the outcome will 
provide an accurate measure of racism than with more traditional approaches.  
In this paper, we present the results a field experiment aimed at studying attitudes 
towards racial and ethnic minorities in Australia, a country whose immigration policy has been 
admired by other countries.
1 Unlike many field experiments, looking only at a single minority 
group, we take a broader focus: comparing attitudes to Anglo-Saxon Australians with attitudes 
to Indigenous Australians (the original inhabitants of the continent), Italian Australians (a 
relatively established migrant group), Chinese Australians (a more recent migrant group), and 
Middle Eastern Australians (another recent migrant group). By comparing across these groups, 
we hope to shed light on how the process of immigrant assimilation might change over time.  
With one in four residents born overseas, Australia is often regarded as something of a 
poster child for its ability to absorb new migrants into its social and economic fabric.
2 Skilled 
                                                            
1 For example, this points system has subsequently been taken up by other countries, including New Zealand and, 
from 2008, the UK. 
2 The 2006 Census indicates that 28% of the foreign-born in Australia are from ‘Anglo’ countries, namely the 
UK, New Zealand, South Africa, USA, Ireland and Canada (listed in order of numerical importance).  2 
 
migrants are selected through a points system, which gives preference to applicants with high 
qualifications and workers in high-demand occupations.
3 Perhaps because of this, most 
research has found little discernable impact of migrants on the labor market conditions of 
Australian natives. 
Yet recent events suggest that the Australian melting pot may not be so successful after 
all. In the late 1990s, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, with its policy of reducing Asian 
immigration to Australia, polled well in a number of federal and state elections. At the time of 
the 2000 Sydney Olympics, many journalists drew attention to the poor social indicators 
among Indigenous Australians. And in 2005, anti-Muslim riots on Sydney’s Cronulla Beach 
drew international attention. As a series of reports have shown, some minority groups in 
Australia suffer extreme forms of persecution at work and in public places (see e.g. Walker 
2001; Kabir and Evans 2002; Poynting and Noble 2004; VicHealth 2007; Berman et al. 2008). 
Our experiment aims to estimate racial discrimination by employers. To do this, we 
conduct an audit discrimination study in which we randomly submit over 4000 fictional 
applications for entry-level jobs, varying only the name as an indicator of ethnicity.  In terms 
of number of applications submitted, ours is one of the largest audit discrimination studies ever 
conducted. This allows us to look at multiple racial groups, and to see whether our effects 
differ by the gender of the fictitious applicant, the type of job advertised, and the city in which 
the job is located. 
Relative to other work on discrimination, our paper is novel in that we compare across 
multiple ethnic groups. This allows us to learn more about the assimilation process than is 
possible with studies that focus on just one minority.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, we present background 
information on the share of Australians falling into the four racial/ethnic categories studied in 
this paper, and review the available evidence on labor market outcomes and attitudinal 
surveys. In section III, we discuss the experiment and the various discrimination hypotheses 
that our research proposes to test. In section IV, we present the results of our experiment, and 
compare our findings with those from other similar studies. The final section concludes. 
 
II. Background 
We briefly outline the characteristics of the ethnic groups that are the focus of this study by 
reviewing the literature on their population share, employment outcomes, and levels of 
                                                            
3 See Hatton (2005). 3 
 
surveyed discrimination. Figure 1 depicts the share of Australian residents in each of the four 
ethnic minority groups, based upon data from the Australian census, which was conducted in 
1901, 1911, 1921, 1933, 1947, 1954, and every five years from 1961 onwards. Until the 1960s, 
the share of Australians reporting their race as Indigenous was about 1 percent of the 
population. Since then, the share has risen steadily, and was over 2 percent in 2006. This 
change has been driven by two factors: higher fertility rates, and a growing willingness of 
respondents to self-identify as Indigenous.  
For Italian, Chinese, and Middle Eastern Australians, our estimates are based upon 
country of birth (thereby ignoring second-generation immigrants). As the graph shows, 
Australia experienced a large influx of Italian migrants immediately after World War II. From 
the late-1970s, the share of Australians who are Italian-born has steadily declined. By contrast, 
immigration from China and the Middle East only began to expand in the 1970s and 1980s. By 
2006, the share of Australians born in Italy, China, and the Middle East was about 1 percent 
each. 
Since our experiment will focus on ethnicity rather than country of birth, a more 
appropriate comparator might be ancestry. However, the Australian census has not consistently 
asked respondents about their ancestry. Therefore it is only possible to look at recent data, and 
not to construct a time series of ancestry shares. We focus here on respondents’ first answer to 
the ancestry question in the 2006 census (it was possible to give multiple ancestries). The 
ancestries that are relevant to our analysis are Italian (4%), Chinese (3%), and Arab (1%). By 
comparison, the most common ancestries are Australian (27%) and British (35%). It is not 
possible to distinguish Indigenous ancestry. While the country of birth figures suggest that 
Italians, Chinese, and Middle Easterners are about equally represented among first-generation 
migrants, the ancestry data indicate that Italians are substantially more numerous among 
second-generation (and higher generation) migrants.  
Table 1 shows how these four minority groups perform in the Australian labor market.
4 
We estimate three outcome measures – participation, log annual hours, and log hourly wages – 
with the omitted group being Australian-born non-Indigenous respondents. For this analysis, 
we require a large dataset with good information on employment participation and hourly 
wages. Although the census samples are relatively large, earnings and hours are coded in 
                                                            
4 Naturally, we are not the first to use standard surveys to analyze migrant performance in the Australian labor 
market. For studies that have looked at various aspects of the labor market performance of migrants in Australia, 
see eg. Cobb-Clark (2003); Mahuteau and Junankar (2008). 4 
 
bands, leading to very imprecise measures of hourly wages.
5 We therefore opt to use the 2001-
06 Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey (HILDA), pooling all six 
waves and clustering standard errors at the person level. The sample is restricted to those who 
are aged 21-64, with nonmissing information for all covariates. 
Table 1 near here 
 
Indigenous respondents are coded according to whether or not they self-identified as 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (HILDA respondents are not asked whether their parents 
are Indigenous). Respondents are coded as Italian, Chinese, or Middle Eastern if they – or 
either of their parents – were born in one of those countries/regions.
6 We exclude first-
generation or second-generation migrants from other regions, so that the omitted group 
comprises respondents who were born in Australia and whose parents were both born in 
Australia.  Across this particular sample, 3 percent of respondents are Indigenous, 5 percent 
are Italian, 3 percent are Chinese, and 3 percent are Middle Eastern.  
In columns 1, 3, and 5, we include only a parsimonious set of controls – a survey year 
indicator, a gender indicator, and a quadratic in age. In this specification, most of the 
coefficients are negative, and there are four significant differences. In terms of employment,  
Indigenous respondents are 20 percentage points less likely to be employed, Chinese 
respondents are 9 percentage points less likely to be employed, and Middle Eastern 
respondents are 11 percent less likely to be employed. Conditional on being employed, 
Indigenous respondents work 19 percent fewer hours. Note that we find no significant 
differences in hourly wages. If employers (or customers or co-workers) have a distaste for 
associating with workers from ethnic minorities, or if there is statistical discrimination, we 
would expect to see lower wages being offered for these groups. Yet this is not observed in the 
HILDA data. This may reflect the fact that the Australian minimum wage is one of the highest 
in the developed world (Leigh 2007).  Other features of the Australian employment system 
also lead to wage rigidity – for example, 17 percent of employees have their wages set by 
industrial awards, while a further 39 percent have their wages set through registered collective 
                                                            
5 An alternative approach would have been to simply look at unemployment rates, using data on country of birth 
from the August 2006 Employee Earnings and Hours Survey, and data on race from the August 2006 census. The 
unemployment rates by country of birth in 2007 were: born in Australia 4.0%, born in Italy 3.7%, born in China 
7.2%, and born in North Africa/Middle East 9.5%. The unemployment rate by race in 2006 was 5.0% for non-
Indigenous people, and 15.6% for Indigenous  people. 
6 We include Hong Kong and Taiwan as part of China. Countries defined as Middle Eastern are Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, and Turkey. Because of the 
way we code ethnicity, the categories are not mutually exclusive. Dropping respondents who are in more than one 
minority ethnic category makes no tangible difference to the results. 5 
 
agreements (ABS 2009).
7 Given this institutional framework, the principal margin on which 
employers can adjust is likely to be through hiring (Becker, 1971). We would therefore expect 
to see lower employment rates for ethnic minorities. This is indeed what is observed in 
columns 1, 3, and 5. 
Table 2 near here 
 
However, what happens when additional observables are added to the specification? In 
columns 2, 4, and 5, we include controls for years of actual labor market experience, years of 
education, and self-assessed English proficiency. In this specification, the coefficients tend to 
be closer to zero, and the only significant differences are for Indigenous respondents, who are 
12 percent less likely to be employed, and work on average 15 percent fewer hours. However, 
the standard errors in Table 1 are sufficiently large that we cannot rule out modest levels of 
labor market discrimination, even controlling for observable productivity differences. 
Moreover, there are potentially important productivity differences that are unobservable, 
including school quality, interpersonal skills, and work ethics. To the extent that these are 
correlated with a respondent’s race or ethnicity, they could help explain (or confound) 
estimates of labor market discrimination.  
Can we learn more about employers’ ‘tastes for discrimination’ by examining reports 
of  Australians’ attitudes to these minority groups? One way to address this is to use surveys 
asking Australians if immigration from particular regions should be reduced. According to one 
recent survey, 12 percent of Australians thought immigration from Europe should be reduced, 
23 percent thought immigration from Asia should be reduced, and 38 percent thought 
immigration from the Middle East should be reduced (Issues Deliberation Australia 2007). 
Surveys on attitudes to intermarriage find similar results (Dunn 2003; Forrest and Dunn 2007). 
These findings certainly seem to suggest that, for whatever reason, there is prejudice in 
Australia against particular ethnic groups. This could manifest itself in taste-based 
discrimination by employers, workers, or  customers.  Next we consider whether or not there is 




7 Registered collective agreements are defined by the ABS as “An agreement between an employer (or group of 
employers) and a group of employees (or one or more unions or employee associations representing the 
employees). A collective agreement sets the terms of employment (pay and/or conditions) for a group of 
employees, and is usually registered with a Federal or State industrial tribunal or authority.” 6 
 
III. The Audit Discrimination Experiment 
The basic notion underlying audit discrimination studies is that an unbiased estimate of the 
extent of hiring discrimination can be determined by conducting an experiment in which 
fictional CVs, carrying ethnically or racially identifiable names, are sent to employers. By 
comparing the callback rates for different ethnic groups, the researcher can estimate the degree 
of racial or ethnic discrimination in a particular context. 
According to a comprehensive review of the literature (Riach and Rich 2002), written 
audit discrimination studies were initially conducted by British sociologists in 1969 (Jowell 
and Prescott-Clarke 1970). Since then, researchers have applied the technique to Australia, 
France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. (Below, we compare our findings to 
those from previous studies.) Using written CVs, the audit discrimination technique has been 
used to measure discrimination on the basis of gender, age, obesity, having a criminal record, 
facial attractiveness, and sexual orientation. As well as studies that use written applications, 
researchers have also trained pairs of actors to show up for job interviews, apply for rental 
housing, and negotiate to purchase used cars (for a recent survey, see Pager 2007).  
While such audit discrimination studies using fake CVs have the advantage of 
providing unbiased estimates of the degree of discrimination in the hiring process, they can 
only observe the first stage of the employment process. In theory, the level of discrimination in 
the pre-interview stage could be negatively or positively correlated with discrimination in 
hiring decisions and wage offers. As Heckman (1998, 102) notes, “A well-designed audit study 
could uncover many individual firms that discriminate, while at the same time the marginal 
effect of discrimination on the wages of employed workers could be zero.”
8  
During the six months from April 2007 to October 2007, we applied for over 5000 jobs 
using an online job-finding website. Such a large sample size provides sufficient statistical 
power to not only look at differences across five ethnic groups (Anglo-Saxon, Indigenous, 
Chinese, Italian, and Middle Eastern), but also to see whether such effects differed by gender, 
city, and job type. For example, we still have around 280 individuals per cell when looking at 
differences by ethnicity and city. However, our results are fragile once we go to three-level 
tabulations (e.g. ethnicity by job type by gender), so we do not show such results in our 
tabulations.  
                                                            
8 Heckman (1998) and Heckman and Siegelman (1993) present a number of additional critiques of the 
methodology used in audit studies. Since these primarily deal with studies that use actors, we do not address them 
here, but one response may be found in Pager (2007). 7 
 
In selecting appropriate occupations for this study, we focused on jobs that did not 
require any post-school qualifications, and for which the application process was relatively 
straightforward (in order to ensure that we could complete a sufficient number of applications 
to have good statistical power). 
 
Conjectures 
While our primary goal is to establish the extent of discrimination and how it varies across 
ethnic minorities in Australia, we also wished to test a number of related conjectures. These 
are as follows. 
First, we aim to test the conjecture that employers differentially discriminate in 
response to perceived customer preferences. To assess this, we deliberately select occupations 
for our analysis that involve face-to-face contact, and those that do not. The four occupations 
we select are: waitstaff, data entry, customer service, and sales.  Data entry involves no 
customer contact, and therefore customer discriminatory preferences should not play a role in 
the employer’s callback decision. In contrast, waitstaff jobs entail a high degree of 
interpersonal contact. Hence for these jobs we would expect ethnic applicants to receive lower 
callback rates if customer discriminatory preferences matter.  
Examples of the types of jobs falling within these occupational categories are as 
follows. Waitstaff jobs included positions at bistros, cafés, bars, restaurants, and hotels. Data 
entry positions – also known as document processing officers or technical records officers – 
included jobs working for an airline, a radio station, a bank, and a charity. Customer service 
jobs were a mix of telephone support and face-to-face positions (it was often difficult to 
distinguish these from the information available), and included staffing the front desk at a 
bowling alley, answering customer support calls at a private health insurance company, and 
staffing the front desk at a parking garage. Sales positions almost entirely involved in-person 
sales, and included jobs at a tiling store, a supermarket, an electrical goods store, and a 
pizzeria.   
Table 2 gives average wages and share female in these occupations, based on data from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Employee Earnings and Hours survey, conducted in 
August 2006. The four jobs, more feminized than the non-managerial workforce as a whole, 
also have a slightly above-average share of employees from non-English-speaking 
backgrounds. Across the four jobs, workers are paid about three quarters of average wages.  
Table 2 near here 8 
 
The second conjecture that we wished to test was whether or not employers  in 
different Australian cities differentially discriminate against ethnic minority applicants. We 
therefore applied for jobs in Australia’s three largest cities: Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane. 
These cities differ in terms of their ethnic composition (with Sydney being the most ethnically 
diverse of the three), their immigration history, and in the prevailing rate of unemployment at 
the time of our study (with Brisbane having the tightest labor market).   
Our third conjecture is whether or not racial-majority employers discriminate against 
minority groups. We explore this in two ways, to be explained in greater detail towards the end 
of this section. The first involves matching on the characteristics of the zipcode in which the 
employer is located. The second exploits the fact that, for many jobs, we know the name of the 
contact person listed on the advertisement, the person who responded to one or more of our 
applicants, and sometimes both.  
Our last conjecture might be that any observed differences in callback rates reflects 
statistical discrimination, rather than tastes for discrimination on the part of employers, 
potential co-workers or customers. In an audit study such as ours, it is difficult to separate 
statistical discrimination from other possible factors. We discuss this in more detail below. 
 
Collecting the data 
 For each job category, we created four fictional CV templates that we used to apply for jobs. 
These were obtained from a broad Internet search for similar CVs, and tailored to the particular 
job. The CV template was augmented with the addition of an address (we selected four street-
suburb combinations in middle-income neighborhoods, and randomized the street number 
between 1 and 20). Two sample CVs are depicted in Appendix Figures 1 and 2. 
The ethnicity and race of the applicant was denoted by an ethnically distinguishable 
name, which appeared in large print at the top of the CV. For each ethnic/racial group, we 
identified five female first names, five male first names, and five last names, which were 
combined randomly to create the job applicant’s name. Ideally, we would have obtained access 
to a large database of Australians, containing names and self-identified race/ethnicity. 
However, we were unable to locate a suitable public database, and sample surveys such as the 
HILDA survey (or Indigenous databases such as those held by the Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies) turned down our requests to tabulate lists of 
common names. We therefore chose our Anglo-Saxon, Italian, Chinese, and Middle Eastern 
names by consulting the website www.behindthename.com, and our Indigenous names by 9 
 
consulting the indexes of various books listing Indigenous artists.
9 The full list of names used 
in this study is provided in Appendix Table 1. 
The job-finding website that we used had an online application process. For each 
advertised position, we submitted four applications, ensuring that each of the four applications 
was from a different ethnic group. Each application included a short covering letter, plus a fake 
CV. For each sex-race cell, we set up a separate phone line with an answering machine (all 
answering machines had a message left by a person with a regular Australian accent), plus an 
email address. Employers could invite the applicant back for an interview by either sending an 
email or making a telephone call.  
 
IV. The Results 
Table 3 sets out the callback rates from the experiment. In Panel A, we show results pooling 
men and women. For Anglo-Saxon-sounding names, the mean callback rate was 35 percent.
10 
However, names connoting the four minority groups received a lower callback rate, with 
Indigenous applicants obtaining an interview 26 percent of the time, Chinese 21 percent of the 
time, Italian 32 percent of the time, and Middle Eastern 22 percent of the time. For Indigenous, 
Chinese, and Middle Eastern applicants, the difference is highly statistically significant, but the 
Anglo vs. Italian difference is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
11 
Table 3 near here 
 
The middle column of Table 3 expresses the difference as a ratio. This is useful 
because it provides an intuitive metric for the level of discrimination in terms of the number of 
additional job applications that a minority applicant must submit to get the same number of 
callbacks as an Anglo applicant. These ratios indicate that, in order to get as many interviews 
as an Anglo applicant, an Indigenous person must submit 35 percent more applications, a 
Chinese person must submit 68 percent more applications, an Italian person must submit 12 
percent more applications, and a Middle Eastern person 64 percent more applications.  
                                                            
9 Since our CVs suggest that the job applicants are aged in their twenties, it is unlikely that employers would have 
thought that female applicants with non-Anglo names were actually Anglo respondents who had taken on a non-
Anglo last name by marriage. 
10 We also tested for differences between Catholic and Protestant names, but found no mean difference between 
the two groups. Because Catholic respondents were identified both by name and by having a Catholic school on 
their CV, we were concerned that they might not make an appropriate control group for the purpose of focusing 
on ethnicity and race. We therefore dropped Catholic CVs from the sample for the current analysis.  
11 Although all applicants attended school in Australia, and we are able to hold constant their education and 
experience, it is possible that stereotypes about productivity still remain. However, as noted below, we find little 
evidence that second-generation immigrants have inferior English-speaking skills.  10 
 
Panels B and C separate the analysis into female and male applicants. This 
specification indicates that female Italian applicants are not discriminated against (relative to 
female Anglo applicants), but otherwise the minority groups all have significantly lower 
callback rates. Relative to Anglo applicants of the same sex, discrimination is generally worse 
for minority men than for minority women (the exception being those with Chinese-sounding 
names).
12 However, when we formally test whether racial discrimination differs by gender, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the level of discrimination is the same for men and women of 
the same ethnic group. In Booth and Leigh (2008), we explore gender differences in more 
detail and find that, overall, female candidates are more likely to receive a callback than male 
candidates (the differences are largest for waitstaff and data entry occupations). 
One way to benchmark our results is to compare the number of additional applications 
that a minority candidate must submit in order to expect the same number of interviews. 
Another is to think about the kind of labor market that minority applicants face.
13 In effect, we 
can ask the question: what would the prevailing unemployment rate have to be for an Anglo 
person to face the same job-finding task as a member of a minority group? 
To answer this, we exploit the fact that the unemployment rate differs across time, and 
across the three cities in our experiment. Using only Anglo-Saxon respondents, we run a 
simple probit regression of whether a given respondent gets an interview on the prevailing 
unemployment rate in that month and city. The coefficient from this regression is -0.065 
(standard error 0.033), suggesting that a 1-point increase in the unemployment rate reduces the 
probability of an Anglo-Saxon applicant getting an interview by 6.5 percent. On average, the 
prevailing unemployment rate during our analysis was 4.3 percent. However, when we 
combine the analysis in the previous paragraph with the results in Table 3, it suggests that:  
•  Indigenous applicants faced the same difficulties in obtaining an interview as an Anglo 
applicant when the unemployment rate was 5.6 percent;   
•  Chinese applicants faced the same difficulties in obtaining an interview as an Anglo 
applicant when the unemployment rate was 6.4 percent;   
•  Italian applicants faced the same difficulties in obtaining an interview as an Anglo 
applicant when the unemployment rate was 4.8 percent;   
•  Middle Eastern applicants faced the same difficulties in obtaining an interview as an 
Anglo applicant when the unemployment rate was 6.4 percent.   
                                                            
12 We are inclined not to make much of the larger effect for Chinese women, since many non-Chinese would 
probably have difficulty distinguishing between male and female Chinese first names.  
13 Another approach would be to benchmark the magnitude of our effects against the benefit of more education. 
However, returns to education did not differ systematically within jobs. We return to this issue below. 11 
 
 
In summary, we have found clear evidence of discrimination in selection for interviews for 
entry-level jobs in Australia. Of course, the audit discrimination technique only observes the 
first stage of the employment process – selection for an interview – and hence we cannot 
comment on the second stage of receiving a job offer. Nonetheless, our results provide clear 
evidence of racial and ethnic discrimination at the callback stage. Next, we compare our 
findings with earlier studies, before attempting to tease out more information about the reasons 
for such discrimination and testing the conjectures outlined in the previous section. 
 
How do our results compare with similar audit studies from other countries? 
A survey by Riach and Rich (2002), supplemented with a literature review, returned 18 
comparable studies (including ours), covering 34 minority ethnic groups. The results are set 
out in full in Appendix Table 2, and graphed in Figure 2. The first comparison is with the 
earlier Australian audit discrimination estimates from Riach and Rich (1991), based on data 
collected in Melbourne between 1984 and 1988. In that study, the two minority groups were 
Greeks and Vietnamese. Although our study does not analyze either of those two groups, it is 
possible that discrimination involves regional stereotyping. To the extent that this is true, it is 
notable that we observe little change in the level of discrimination against migrants from 
Southern Europe (comparing Greeks in 1986 with Italians in 2007), but a substantial increase 
in discrimination against migrants from South East Asia (comparing Vietnamese in 1986 with 
Chinese in 2007).
14 
Figure 2 also provides an international benchmark for our results. For example, the level of 
callback discrimination against Indigenous Australians in 2007 was lower than the level of 
discrimination against African-Americans in the United States in 2001–2008, but higher than 
the level of discrimination against Latino Americans in 2004. The level of discrimination 
against Chinese Australians in 2007 is higher than the discrimination against Asians in the UK 
in 1997 and against Chinese in Canada in 2008, but lower than against Asians in Ireland in 
2008. The level of discrimination against Middle Eastern Australians in 2007 appears similar 
to the level of discrimination against Arabic and Middle Easterners in Sweden in 2005-07. And 
the level of discrimination against Italian Australians in 2007 is similar to the level of 
discrimination against Australians in the UK in 1977–78. 
Figure 2 near here 
                                                            
14 However, if we restrict the 2007 sample to Melbourne applicants only, there is no apparent discrimination 
against Southern Europeans applying for jobs in Australia in 2007. 12 
 
 
Is there evidence of customer discrimination? 
We constructed our experiment so that some of the jobs for which we applied required no 
customer contact, and therefore customer discriminatory preferences should play no role in the 
employer’s callback decision. In contrast, others entail a high degree of interpersonal contact. 
A test for whether or not customer preferences might matter involves testing if the degree of 
ethnic/racial discrimination differs across the four job types in the survey. These are waitstaff, 
data entry, customer service, and sales. If customer discrimination is important, then one 
should expect to see substantially more discrimination in jobs that involve the highest degree 
of interpersonal contact (waitstaff) than those involving no customer contact (data entry). 
These results are presented in Table 4. Across the four jobs, we observe the greatest 
amount of discrimination against minority applicants seeking waitstaff jobs. A Chinese and 
Middle Eastern person seeking a job as a waiter or waitress must submit fully twice as many 
applications in order to get as many interviews as an Anglo-Saxon applicant. However, there is 
only slightly less discrimination in data entry jobs, and a formal test cannot reject that the 
degree of discrimination is the same in both occupations. This suggests that relatively little of 
the observed discrimination can be attributed solely to customer-based discrimination. 
Curiously, the one job in which the level of discrimination appears to be lower is 
customer service, in which there is no statistically significant discrimination against any of the 
minority ethnic groups. This is also the one occupation in which those with more education 
were significantly more likely to receive an interview (a pattern that did not hold in other 
occupations, as we discuss below). This suggests that there could potentially be less 
discrimination in higher-skill occupations than in the low-skill jobs analyzed here.  
Table 4 near here 
 
Are there differences in discrimination across cities? 
Our second conjecture was that employers in the major Australian cities differentially 
discriminate against ethnic-minority applicants. The three largest cities - Sydney, Melbourne, 
and Brisbane - differ in terms of their ethnic composition, immigration history, and 
unemployment rates at the time of our study (with Brisbane having the tightest labor market).   
To what extent do levels of discrimination differ across the three cities in our experiment? In 
Table 5, we present results tabulated separately for Brisbane, Melbourne, and Sydney. In 
general, the patterns are quite similar. In each of the cities, discrimination is highest against 
Chinese and Middle Eastern applicants, followed by Indigenous applicants, followed by Italian 13 
 
applicants. However, the point estimates are suggestive of non-trivial differences. For 
example, if they are to get as many interviews as an applicant with an Anglo name, Chinese 
applicants must put in 57 percent more applications in Brisbane, but 92 percent more 
applications in Sydney. In addition, there is a statistically significant degree of discrimination 
against Italians in Brisbane, but no evidence of discrimination against Italians in Melbourne. 
To the extent that such differences exist, they could be due to the tightness of the labor market, 
the ethnic mix of the city, or differences in social norms. However, when we formally test the 
hypothesis that discrimination is equal across the three cities, we are unable to reject it for any 
of the three city-pair combinations. (Focusing on individual ethnicities, the only significant 
difference is the degree of discrimination against Italians in Brisbane and Melbourne.) 
Table 5 near here  
 
Does discrimination vary with employer characteristics? 
Our third conjecture was that racial-majority employers discriminate against minority groups. 
To test this, we investigate if the level of discrimination varies systematically with employer 
characteristics. We explore this in two ways. First, we match on the characteristics of the 
zipcode in which the employer is located, using data from the 2006 census. Although this has 
the advantage of precision, it suffers from the drawback that we cannot distinguish the 
channels through which neighborhood characteristics affect employer behavior. For example, 
employers in high-minority neighborhoods might themselves be non-Anglo, or they might 
have greater exposure to other minorities.  
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 6 where the sample is the 2701 
applicants for which we know the zipcode of the employer and the dependent variable the 
callback probability. In column 1, we interact the applicant’s ethnicity with a measure of the 
share of respondents born overseas in the zipcode. The interaction coefficients are generally 
positive, suggesting that discrimination is lower when there are more migrants in a 
neighborhood. This interaction is significant (at the 10 percent level) for Middle Eastern 
applicants. However, the magnitude of the effect is quite small – suggesting that discrimination 
against Middle Eastern applicants is only wiped out when four-fifths of the zipcode is 
overseas-born. 
In column 2, we interact the applicant’s ethnicity with the share of people in the 
employer’s zipcode that were born in that country. In column 3, we interact the applicant’s 
ethnicity with the share of people in the employer’s zipcode that have that ancestry. Although 
one main effect is significant (employers located in neighborhoods with more Chinese 14 
 
residents have higher callback rates), the interaction effects are insignificant (we do not 
observe any systematic relationship between applicants’ ethnicity and the share of their ethnic 
group in the employer’s neighborhood).  
Table 6 near here 
 
We next exploit the fact that for many jobs, we know the name of the contact person 
listed on the advertisement, the person who responded to one or more of our applicants, and 
sometimes both. Software known as OnoMap (see www.onomap.org), developed by 
researchers at University College London, was used to impute the ethnicity of these 
individuals, providing a proxy measure of the ethnicity of the person who made the hiring 
decision. OnoMap assigns ethnicity based on first names and last names, exploiting large 
databases in which individuals’ true names and ethnicities are known. For more details of the 
coding algorithm, see Mateos et al. (2007) and Mateos (2007).  
  The results of this exercise are shown in Table 7, in the form of probit regressions 
where the dependent variable is the callback rate. In the first three columns, we simply classify 
contact people and responding people as Anglo (i.e. with names in the OnoMap Celtic or 
English categories), or non-Anglo (i.e. with names in the following OnoMap groups: African, 
East Asian & Pacific, European, Greek, Hispanic, International, Jewish & Armenian, Muslim, 
Sikh, or South Asian). In columns 4-6, we classify employer names as being the same or 
different from the applicant’s name (Italian applicants are matched to OnoMap’s European and 
Greek groups, Chinese applicants are matched to OnoMap’s East Asian & Pacific and South 
Asian groups, and Middle Eastern applicants are matched to OnoMap’s Muslim group).
15 
  We observe positive main effects for Chinese employers, who appear to have a higher 
callback rate. However, the only interaction effect we observe is for Italian employers, who 
appear to be significantly less likely to call back job candidates with Italian names. This is a 
surprising pattern, which suggests that a group with a relatively long history in Australia is 
actually less inclined to assist members of the same group. 
Table 7 near here 
 
Can we say anything about statistical discrimination? 
As Arrow (1998: 96) notes, without explicit measures for the individual’s marginal 
productivity, it is impossible to distinguish between taste-based and statistical forms of 
                                                            
15 Matching more narrowly – e.g. matching Italian applicants to OnoMap’s Italian names, and Chinese applicants 
to OnoMap’s Chinese names – makes little difference to the results. 15 
 
discrimination.
16 While in our experiment all applicants attended school in Australia, and we 
hold constant their education and experience, it is likely that stereotypes about productivity 
still remain. For example, employers might view ethnic minority workers as less productive 
because of poor language skills that are not manifest in the application. This might be so even 
though such beliefs receive little support in, for example, the HILDA data. Among HILDA 
respondents who were born in Australia, but whose parents were born overseas, 98-99 percent 
report speaking English “very well” (the highest category in the survey). Since we cannot give 
in our fictional CVs precise measures of the applicant’s productivity, we are unable in this 
study to separately identify the extent of statistical discrimination.
17  
 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
The most common approach to estimating discrimination is through the use of surveys. 
However, such an approach may potentially provide biased estimates of the true extent of 
discrimination. For example, if earnings surveys do not contain good measures of productive 
characteristics such as school quality, and these characteristics are systematically correlated 
with both race and earnings, then their omission may bias estimates of labor market 
discrimination. Similarly, in the case of attitudinal surveys, there is a risk that survey 
respondents may proffer the socially acceptable answer rather than their actual belief.  
To address these concerns, we conducted a large-scale audit discrimination experiment. 
This involved sending fake CVs to employers, to obtain an experimental measure of the 
relationship between job callbacks and the racial soundingness of the applicant’s name. We 
find clear evidence of discrimination, with Chinese and Middle Easterners both having to 
submit at least 50% more applications in order to receive the same number of callbacks as 
Anglo candidates. Indigenous applicants also suffer a statistically significant level of 
discrimination, though the effects are smaller (for example, Indigenous applicants in Australia 
                                                            
16 Statistical discrimination is a market-based explanation that does not require tastes (Arrow, 1998). There are a 
number of different models of statistical discrimination, and they typically all result in the same outcome as the 
taste for discrimination model. The following simple example illustrates. Suppose there are two types of 
individual, A and B, and that a type-A employer faces a pool of similar applicants from both groups. If the risk-
averse employer is better informed about the productivity of their own group A than of group B, s/he will bid 
more for a type-A applicant than a type-B (lower expected variance). Thus type-B applicants would be offered a 
lower starting wage than otherwise identical type-A workers. However, if wages are inflexible, the employer’s 
only margin of adjustment is likely to be hiring. 
17 Indeed, attempting to do so could be counter-productive. For example, a commercial firm that specializes in 
assisting migrants find work in Australia advises its clients “If the job absolutely specifically requires second 
language skills then include your proficiency with that language only. Otherwise do not write anything about your 
other language skills. Especially never write anything about your English language proficiency.” Jobseekers are 
also told “never include your country of birth”, and “Shorten and or anglicise names where possible and 
appropriate” (see www.migrantjobsservices.com.au, checked 18 June 2009). 16 
 
appear to fare a little better than African-Americans in the US job market). We observe 
virtually no discrimination against Italian applicants. To the extent that we can compare our 
results with earlier evidence for Australia, our results do not suggest that ethnic and racial 
discrimination fell from 1986 to 2007.  
Naturally, the use of field experiments to measure discrimination has its own 
limitations. For example, the way in which race and ethnicity is denoted may not necessarily 
be representative of the general population. In our experiment, we use names that were chosen 
on the basis that we judged them to be representative of the various ethnic groups. This allows 
us to conduct an experiment in which we only vary the names, but it has the limitation that our 
results will not necessarily generalize to individuals of the same ethnicity, but with an 
Anglicized name. Another limitation is that our experiment provides a precise estimate on the 
callback stage, but we are unable to speak to discrimination at the interview stage, nor on the 
job.  
Yet in spite of these caveats, our findings are important, since our study is one of the 
first to compare multiple groups of immigrants in a country in which one in four Australians 
are born overseas. As noted at the start of Section II, these groups range from earlier intakes of 
Italians to more recent intakes of Chinese and Middle Eastern individuals, as immigration 
policy in Australia has been progressively relaxed to admit immigrants from more diverse 
backgrounds. In a stark reminder of how far our country has yet to go, we have found clear 
evidence of discrimination against ethnic minorities – especially the more recently admitted 
groups - at the initial stage of the job-finding process. But what explains this prejudice? The 
higher rate of discrimination in the most customer-focused job (waitstaff) is consistent with 
some degree of customer-based discrimination. However, the fact that we observe 
discrimination in an occupation requiring no direct customer contact (data entry) suggests that 
customer discrimination is not the whole story. Other alternatives could include taste-based 
discrimination (on the part of co-workers or employers) or statistical discrimination. We have 
not been able to distinguish between these two broad hypotheses, in common with the vast 
majority of other studies investigating this issue with a variety of different methodologies. We 
suspect it is a bit of both: statistical discrimination in the face of uncertainty and the 
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Table 1: Observed Labor Market Differences by Race/Ethnicity 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent variable: Employed Log  annual  hours Log  hourly  wage 
Indigenous (self-
identified)  -0.200*** -0.122*** -0.185***  -0.152**  -0.042  0.023 
  [0.035] [0.032] [0.060] [0.060] [0.033] [0.028] 
Italian (by birth or 
parentage)  -0.018 0.001 -0.011 -0.007 -0.025 -0.007 
  [0.026] [0.024] [0.029] [0.031] [0.023] [0.021] 
Chinese (by birth or 
parentage) -0.086**  0.014  -0.079  -0.057  0.020  0.053 
  [0.038] [0.034] [0.052] [0.057] [0.058] [0.049] 
Middle Eastern (by 
birth or parentage)  -0.108***  -0.029  -0.08  -0.058  0.056  0.023 
  [0.039] [0.030] [0.066] [0.063] [0.035] [0.032] 
Control for education, 
experience, and 
English proficiency? 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Person-year 
observations  61530 61530 22895 22895 22895 22895 
Individuals  8368 8368 6387 6387 6387 6387 
R
2 or Pseudo R
2  0.04 0.25 0.11 0.16 0.04 0.18 
Source: HILDA survey, waves 1-6. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in brackets. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All regressions control for 
survey year indicators, a quadratic in age, and a gender dummy. Employment results are marginal effects from a 
probit model, while results for annual hours and hourly wages are OLS coefficients. Experience is actual labor 
market experience, education is years of education, and English proficiency is measured by indicators for the four 
options on a self-assessed scale (very well, well, not very well, not at all). Those who do not speak a language 
other than English are assumed to speak English very well. Sample is all respondents aged 21-64 in columns 1-2, 




Table 2: Characteristics of the Jobs 
  Wage Share Female  Share NESB
Waitstaff $18.90 80% 17%
Data entry  $19.10 85% 15%
Customer service  $21.60  68% 17%
Sales $18.50  69% 16%
All full-time non-managerial  $26.00 46% 15%
Source: Wage and share female from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings and Hours survey, 
conducted in August 2006. Share Non-English Speaking Background (NESB) from HILDA, pooling waves 1-6. 
NESB denotes respondents who were born in a non-English-speaking country. Since we only have access to the 




Table 3: Callback rates by soundingness of name and applicant gender 
 Callback  rate  Ratio 
(Anglo-Saxon 








Panel A: Male and Female Applicants 
Anglo-Saxon (N=837)  35% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=848)  26% 1.35 0.09  0.0000
Chinese (N=845)  21% 1.68 0.14  0.0000
Italian (N=835)  32% 1.12 0.04  0.0940
Middle Eastern (N=845)  22% 1.64 0.14  0.0000
Panel B: Female Applicants 
Anglo-Saxon (N=422)  38% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=442)  31% 1.23 0.07  0.0311
Chinese (N=374)  21% 1.82 0.01  0.0000
Italian (N=410)  37% 1.03 0.01  0.7858
Middle Eastern (N=434)  25% 1.52 0.13  0.0001
Panel C: Male Applicants 
Anglo-Saxon (N=403)  33% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=426)  22% 1.51 0.11  0.0003
Chinese (N=403)  22% 1.54 0.12  0.0002
Italian (N=461)  28% 1.21 0.06  0.0686
Middle Eastern (N=435)  19% 1.76 0.14  0.0000
Does ethnic discrimination 





Note: To test whether ethnic discrimination differs significantly by applicant gender, we run the probit regression  




Ethnicity) + ε 
The dependent variable is a dummy for receiving an interview, while I
Female and I
Ethnicity are, respectively, 
indicators for being female and being in each of the four minority ethnic categories. The Chi
2 test above is a test 










Table 4: Callback rates by soundingness of name and job type 
 Callback  rate Ratio 
(Anglo-










Panel A: Waitstaff 
Anglo-Saxon (N=223)  50% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=215)  29% 1.70 0.20  0.0000
Chinese (N=200)  25% 1.99 0.25  0.0000
Italian (N=211)  39% 1.27 0.10  0.0288
Middle Eastern (N=214)  22% 2.27 0.28  0.0000
Panel B: Data Entry 
Anglo-Saxon (N=222)  34% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=209)  21% 1.60 0.13  0.0031
Chinese (N=199)  19% 1.82 0.15  0.0004
Italian (N=213)  29% 1.18 0.05  0.2472
Middle Eastern (N=207)  20% 1.71 0.14  0.0011
Panel C: Customer Service 
Anglo-Saxon (N=196)  26% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=215)  28% 0.91 -0.02  0.5836
Chinese (N=215)  23% 1.12 0.03  0.5196
Italian (N=201)  32% 0.79 -0.07  0.1337
Middle Eastern (N=220)  25% 1.02 0.01  0.9048
Panel D: Sales 
Anglo-Saxon (N=196)  31% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=209)  27% 1.16 0.04  0.3369
Chinese (N=231)  18% 1.71 0.13  0.0018
Italian (N=210)  26% 1.19 0.05  0.2717
Middle Eastern (N=204)  20% 1.59 0.12  0.0081
Does ethnic discrimination 
differ between waitstaff and 






Note: To test whether ethnic discrimination differs significantly by job, we run the probit regression  




Ethnicity) + ε 
The dependent variable is a dummy for receiving an interview, while I
Waitstaff and I
Ethnicity are, respectively, 
indicators for applying for a waitstaff job and being in each of the four minority ethnic categories. The Chi
2 test 
above is a test for the joint significance of the four λ coefficients. We run this test with waitstaff and data entry 
positions only. 26 
 
 
Table 5: Callback rates by soundingness of name and city 










Panel A: Brisbane 
Anglo-Saxon (N=269)  42% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=281)  30% 1.41 0.12  0.0030
Chinese (N=283)  27% 1.57 0.15  0.0002
Italian (N=286)  33% 1.28 0.09  0.0261
Middle Eastern (N=280)  28% 1.51 0.14  0.0005
Panel B: Melbourne 
Anglo-Saxon (N=282)  27% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=272)  18% 1.48 0.09  0.0154
Chinese (N=278)  17% 1.61 0.10  0.0039
Italian (N=282)  29% 0.93 -0.02  0.5722
Middle Eastern (N=284)  16% 1.64 0.10  0.0026
Panel C: Sydney 
Anglo-Saxon (N=286)  38% NA NA  NA
Indigenous (N=295)  31% 1.25 0.08  0.0537
Chinese (N=284)  20% 1.92 0.18  0.0000
Italian (N=267)  34% 1.14 0.05  0.2450
Middle Eastern (N=281)  21% 1.80 0.17  0.0000
Does ethnic 

















Note: To test whether ethnic discrimination differs significantly by city, we run the probit regression  




Ethnicity) + ε 
The dependent variable is a dummy for receiving an interview, while I
City and I
Ethnicity are, respectively, indicators 
for being in a particular city and being in each of the four minority ethnic categories. The Chi
2 test above is a test 






Table 6: Applicant Ethnicity and Employer Neighborhood Characteristics 
      
      
      
      
      
      
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
 Overseas-born 
share 
Born in same 
country Same  ancestry 
      
      
Indigenous applicant  -0.167***  -0.090***  -0.090*** 
 [0.046]  [0.027] [0.026] 
Chinese applicant  -0.153***  -0.127***  -0.130*** 
 [0.048]  [0.028] [0.028] 
Italian applicant  -0.098*  -0.068**  -0.075** 
 [0.052]  [0.028] [0.035] 
Middle Eastern applicant  -0.205***  -0.127***  -0.127*** 
 [0.042]  [0.024] [0.025] 
Indigenous addressee × Overseas born share  0.201     
 [0.140]     
Chinese addressee × Overseas born share  0.04     
 [0.142]     
Italian addressee × Overseas born share  0.137     
 [0.137]     
Middle Eastern addressee × Overseas born 
share 0.239*     
 [0.140]     
Overseas born share  0.005     
 [0.100]     
Indigenous addressee × Indigenous share    -1.578  -14.919 
   [1.475]  [14.715] 
Chinese addressee × Chinese share    -0.326  -0.165 
   [0.379]  [0.270] 
Italian addressee × Italian share    2.283  1.079 
   [2.041]  [1.098] 
Middle Eastern addressee × Middle Eastern 
share   -1.626  -0.585 
   [1.717]  [0.762] 
Indigenous share    0.328  1.11 
   [0.409]  [0.809] 
Chinese share    0.650***  0.441*** 
   [0.189]  [0.136] 
Italian share    -1.879  -0.759 
   [1.203]  [0.628] 
Middle Eastern share    -0.219  -0.211 
   [0.532]  [0.253] 
Observations 2701  2701  2701 
Pseudo R
2 0.07  0.07  0.07 
Note: Table shows marginal effects from a probit model. Standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All estimates include indicator variables for 
job type, city, and CV template. Share variables are the share born in a given country in column 2, and the share 





          
 
Table 7: Applicant Ethnicity and Employer Ethnicity 













Indigenous  applicant  -0.111*** -0.132*** -0.111*** -0.106*** -0.126*** 
  [0.025] [0.036] [0.025] [0.024] [0.033] 
Chinese  applicant  -0.178*** -0.236*** -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.225*** 
  [0.023] [0.034] [0.024] [0.021] [0.031] 
Italian applicant  -0.065**  -0.054  -0.055**  -0.063**  -0.059* 
  [0.027] [0.038] [0.027] [0.026] [0.035] 
Middle Eastern applicant  -0.145***  -0.231***  -0.160***  -0.146***  -0.218*** 
  [0.024] [0.034] [0.024] [0.022] [0.031] 
Indigenous applicant × Non-
Anglo employer  0.044 0.033 0.085     
 [0.084]  [0.087]  [0.074]     
Chinese applicant × Non-
Anglo employer  0.048 0.024 0.065     
 [0.087]  [0.085]  [0.073]     
Italian applicant × Non-Anglo 
employer 0.081  -0.003  0.077     
 [0.088]  [0.086]  [0.074]     
Middle Eastern applicant × 
Non-Anglo employer  -0.019  0.068  0.079     
 [0.078]  [0.085]  [0.073]     
Non-Anglo employer  -0.001  0.021  0.016     
 [0.053]  [0.060]  [0.048]     
          
Chinese applicant × Chinese 
employer       0.14  0.055 
       [0.102]  [0.101] 
Italian applicant × Italian 
employer       -0.178**  -0.244* 
       [0.086]  [0.131] 
Middle Eastern applicant × 
Middle Eastern employer        -0.125  -0.078 
       [0.141]  [0.219] 
Chinese employer        0.157  0.209*** 
       [0.101]  [0.077] 
Italian employer        0.02  -0.001 
       [0.039]  [0.043] 
Middle Eastern employer        0.041  0.021 
       [0.090]  [0.099] 
          
Observations 2335  2319  3313  2335  2319 
Pseudo R
2 0.07  0.09  0.06  0.07  0.09 
 Note: Table shows marginal effects from a probit model. Standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All estimates include indicator variables for 
job type, city, and CV template. Employer ethnicity is imputed using the name of the contact in the job 
advertisement in columns 1 and 4, the name of the person who responded to candidates in columns 2 and 5, and 





Appendix Table 1: Ethnically Distinctive Names 
Anglo first names  Female: Jennifer, Lisa, Kimberly, Sarah, Amy 
Male: Martin, Andrew, Phillip, Adam, Brian 
Anglo last names  Abbott, Adams, Johnson, Mitchell, Robinson 
Middle Eastern first names  Female: Fatima, Lala, Nadine, Anan, Hiyam 
Male: Ahmed, Hassan, Bilal, Mahmoud, Rafik 
Middle Eastern last names  Hariri, Baghdadi, Chikhani, Kassir, Gemayel 
Indigenous first names  Female: Betty, Winnie, Daisy, Dorothy, Peggy 
Male: Bobby, Jimmy, Tommy, Wally, Ronnie 
Indigenous last names  Japanangka, Tjungarrayi, Djukukul, Tipungwuti, 
Puruntatameri 
Chinese first names  Female: Ping, Ming, Xiu, Ya, Nuying 
Male: Tai, Hong, Yin, Peng, Hu 
Chinese last names  Chen, Lin, Huang, Lee, Chang 
Italian first names  Female: Maria, Anna, Rosa, Angela, Giovanna 
Male: Giuseppe, Giovanni, Antonio, Mario, 
Luigi 






Appendix Table 2: Comparison with Other Audit Discrimination Studies 
Study Country  Year(s) 
of test 




Riach and Rich (1991)  Australia  1984–88  Vietnamese  1.38 
         Greek  1.10 
Booth et al. (This study)  Australia  2007  Indigenous  1.35 
     Chinese  1.68 
     Italian  1.12 
     Middle  Eastern  1.64 
Oreopoulos (2009)  Canada  2008  Indian  1.31 
     Chinese  1.46 
     Pakistani  1.44 
Bovenkerk et al. (1979)   France 1976–77  Antillian  3.47 
Goldberg et al. (1996)  Germany   1994  Turkish  1.12 
McGinnity et al. (2009)  Ireland  2008  African  2.44 
     Asian  1.80 
     German  2.07 
Bovenkerk et al. (1995)  Netherlands  1993–94  Surinamese  1.22 
Carlsson and Rooth (2007)  Sweden  2005–06  Middle Eastern  1.50 
Bursell (2007)  Sweden  2006–07  Arabic/African  1.80 
Jowell and Prescott-Clarke (1970)  UK  1969  Asian  2.08 
         West Indian  1.13 
McIntosh and Smith (1974)  UK  1973  Asian /West Indian  1.47 
Firth (1981)   UK  1977–78  Asian  1.95 
       West Indian  1.76 
       Australian  1.14 
       French  1.25 
         African  1.60 
Hubbuck and Carter (1980)  UK  1977–79  Asian  1.80 
         West Indian  1.81 
         Italian  1.12 
Brown and Gay (1985)   UK  1984–85  Asian/West Indian  1.32 
Esmail and Everington (1993)  UK  1992  Asian  2.00 
Esmail and Everington (1997)  UK  1997  Asian  1.44 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)  US  2001–02  African-American  1.50 
Pager (2003)  US  2001  African-American  2.43 
Pager et al. (2009)  US  2004  African-American  2.04 
     Latino  1.23 
Note: All studies dated before 2000 (except Goldberg et al. 1996) are summarized in Riach and Rich (2002). Note 
that Jowell and Prescott-Clarke (1970) changed not only the names but also the qualifications. For Bovenkerk et 
al. (1995), we take the average of the estimate for Surinamese males (1.27) and females (1.17). Estimates from 
Pager (2003) exclude job applicants with criminal convictions. Estimates from Oreopoulos (2009) are based on 
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